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I.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current practice of local government
taxation in Pakistan and to point the way toward structural reforms that are both more
rational and more in step with Pakistan’s vision for its fiscal decentralization. The
analysis here is restricted to sub provincial governments, i.e., districts, TMA’s and union
councils but with a decided emphasis on the former two. We do this by examining the
current practice, and by drawing on international comparisons and “best practices” as laid
out in the theory of fiscal federalism.
In the next two sections of this paper, we review the backdrop for local
government taxation in Pakistan. First, the structure of local government and local
governance, and local budget autonomy are reviewed. Second, we describe the system of
intergovernmental fiscal relations that currently is in place, as a way of describing the
setting in which any reform of the tax system would take place. In section III we turn to
a description of the local government intergovernmental fiscal system as it now exists in
1
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Pakistan, and follow this with a discussion of how well this fits with both best
international practice and with the national decentralization plan in Pakistan. In sections
IV and V we consider the international practice as regards local government taxation in
developing countries. In the final section we consider options for reform and evaluate
their feasibility.
This analysis suffers from an absence of data. There is no systematic compilation
of local government finances in Pakistan, so it is not possible to give an overall
quantitative assessment of the importance of local government finance. Instead, we must
rely on anecdotal evidence and a small sample of data specifically gathered for this
project.

II. Local Government in Pakistan
The structure of local government and the provisions for local governance are not
well defined in the constitution. But it is laid out clearly in the provincial statutes. This
structure plus the provisions for local budget autonomy give the context in which local
government tax policy may be set.

Local Government
Local government is Pakistan is a provincial subject. Provinces can lay down the
basic legal framework for their creation and operations. The constitution distributes
revenue powers between federal government and provinces and in turn provinces
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decentralize some of their powers to the local government1. Functions and revenue
raising powers are assigned to local governments through provincial laws. In practice,
local governments have always been created under laws simultaneously legislated in each
province. In 2001 four Local Government Ordinances were promulgated. However, the
prototype ordinance was developed at the federal level and provinces complained that
they had very little say in its formulation.
The country has seen three local government systems since 1959. First, the “Basic
Democracies Scheme”, a four tier system, was brought in by a military government, with
a few expenditure subjects but little revenue raising powers assigned to local
governments (Choudhury, 1959; Mahmood, 1965). This system was abolished in 1969 at
the end of the military regime. In 1979 local governments were again created under a
military regime. Separate local bodies were created under provincial control for urban
and rural areas. Assignment of functions was not very different from the basic
democracies and revenue assignment remained weak (Zaidi, 2005). The system
continued, but with problems. In some cases the provincial governments replaced elected
councils with appointed administrators, and this arrangement continued for nearly a
decade. This system was replaced by the present structure of local governments in 2001.
The local governments in each province vary by size, population and taxable
capacity. But the same three tier system is present in each of the four provinces. The total
number of local governments in each province is shown in Table 1.
At the upper tier in this system is the District Government (DG). Most local
government services have been assigned to the district. The most important are education,
1

An exception to this rule is the agreement between the federal government and provinces whereby onesixth of the GST revenue at the federal level is designated as a pass through grant to provinces to replace
octroi and zila tax revenues of the local governments.
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health, roads, agricultural extension and industrial development. The districts have been
created from the pre-decentralization provincial departments. District governments have
been assigned specified sources of revenue (See Table 2). They can define the base and
set the rate in the Zila Council. The base, however, cannot be defined outside the
constraints placed by the “Local Government Tax Rules” as prescribed by the provincial
government (Government of Punjab, 2001).
At the second tier are the Tehsil (Taluka in Sindh and Town in urban districts)
Municipal Administrations (TMA). Each district area is divided into TMA jurisdictions,
with the number depending upon the area and population of a district. This tier was
created from the pre-2001 urban local bodies by adding the rural hinterland. Originally,
the Tehsil or Taluka were geographic entities created for land revenue administration.
With the changes in 2001, the entire Tehsil or Taluka became entitled to services earlier
provided only in the urban centers. The jurisdiction of local bodies (corporation,
municipal committee, town committee) under the earlier local government system had
extended to incorporated urban areas only. For rural areas another local body, the District
Council, existed with a smaller set of functions. The TMA jurisdiction includes both rural
and urban areas, with the earlier urban nucleus serving as its headquarter2. TMA
functions are largely municipal services and urban building control3. .
As part of the transformation, the provincial Public Health Engineering (PHE)
department, the agency for supply of drinking water and sanitation facilities in rural
areas, was merged into TMA, providing it with the organizational structure to extend its
services into the newly annexed rural areas. In practice, PHE has remained independent

2
3

For some TMAs, there is no urban nucleus. The headquarters of these TMAs are unincorporated towns.
In city districts, building control has been assigned to the district government.
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of the TMA in many cases. In some cases, provinces have recreated PHE organizations at
the district level to continue building water supply schemes.
TMAs have been assigned sources of revenue (see Table 2). They have retained
the taxation powers of the previous urban local governments. In addition to them, urban
immovable property tax has been assigned to the TMAs. However, the practice of
decentralizing the tax to TMA has fallen behind the legal provisions. This issue is
discussed in more detail below.
The third tier of local government is the Union Administration. The TMA area is
divided into unions, both in urban and rural areas4. The unions perform a few minor
functions and do not have the power to raise revenue. They are financed by a fixed
provincial grant.
Most districts, notwithstanding their rural or urban character, are treated alike in
the law. In general, the assignment of functions and sources of revenue is not different
between urban or rural districts. The exception to the rule is the City District. (Highly
urbanized districts are declared “City Districts”). The assignment of functions and
revenue varies from the ordinary Districts only slightly. The major difference is that
instead of being divided into Tehsil or Taluka Municipal Administrations, the City
District is divided into Town Municipal Administrations. The division of functions
between the two tiers in the City Districts has led to more centralization of service
delivery at the city district. For instance water supply, urban planning and building
control are district functions in City Districts but are with the TMA in ordinary districts.
A higher share of urban immovable property tax for the city districts is under

4

In the earlier local government system, union councils existed in rural areas only. For urban areas it was a
single tier system and for rural areas it was a two-tier local government.
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consideration (Urban Unit, 2007).
The Districts vary in size and population in each province, as is shown in Table 3.
The variations are great. Karachi, with 11.3 million residents5, is the biggest district of
the country. Its organizational structure is somewhat different from an ordinary district
but in general follows the pattern established by the centrally drafted law. The smallest
district in Pakistan is Ziarat (Balochistan) with a population of 39,000 in 2004.
The districts vary in tax base endowments even though the law provides for
similar taxes. The variations in land use -- agriculture, industry and urbanization -- are
wide. Most districts in Balochistan have small urban conurbations with the population
living in small villages spread over large tracts of arid land. The mean population of a
district is less than 300,000. The largest urban center Quetta, which is the only city
district in the province, is smaller in terms of population than the smallest rural district in
Punjab. In terms of area, the Balochistan districts are the largest in the country. They
have a sprawling expanse which is thinly populated, and this leads to a high cost of
service delivery. They have a small agricultural base, are largely dependent on uncertain
rain or high cost pumping stations for irrigation.
In contrast, Punjab districts are mostly endowed with fertile land and canal
irrigation. Five districts are city districts with a high degree of urbanization and industrial
concentration. In addition to these, Sialkot, Gujrat and Sheikhupura are also highly
industrialized with large urban centers, but are yet to be classified as city districts. The
mean population of a district in Punjab is around 2.5 million, and these usually have more
than one urban center. The districts in Sindh, except Karachi, are agricultural with urban

5

NIPS estimates, 2004.
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nuclei. The mean population of a district in Sindh is 2 million but it is skewed due to the
inclusion of Karachi. Most of the industry in Sindh in concentrated in Karachi. NWFP
has one city district, four large urban centers located in ordinary districts with the
remaining districts mostly rural. The mean population of districts in NWFP is less than a
million.
Districts vary widely in terms of their development indicators. Studies have
brought out these variations in each province. Districts have wide variations in health
indicators, education outcomes and income levels. The variations are present between
provinces and among districts in each province (Jamal and Khan, 2007).
The local government functional assignments are uniform with one notable
exception, namely the designation of highly urbanized districts as ‘City Districts’. In the
city districts, the local government assignments are different than the rural or ordinary
districts. The tax structure is the same for both urban and rural districts. The data in Table
4 show the number of the two types of districts in each province.

Local Governance
Local governments at each level have an elected executive and an elected council.
The elections create dual offices. At the lowest tier, members of the union council are
elected through direct elections. Each union council consists of 13 councilors, including
the Nazim and Naib-Nazim of the union. The Nazim serves as the executive head and
Naib-Nazim functions as the speaker of the council. One third of the seats of the union
council are reserved for women councilors. In addition, there are special seats reserved
for peasants and laborers. Both men and women residents of the union elect councilors

8
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for the general and reserved seats under a multiple constituency ward system. Elections
are held on the basis of adult franchise. The Nazims from all the union councils in a
district, in addition to their election as Union Nazim, serve as ex-officio members of the
Zila Council. They form two-thirds of the membership of the council. The remaining
one-third of the council is comprised of reserved seats for women.
At the TMA level, the Naib-Nazims from all the unions in a TMA jurisdiction are
also elected ex-officio members of the TMA council. Similar to the Zila Council, one
third of the membership of the TMA council is in the form of reserved seats for women
councilors. The district and TMA Nazim are elected indirectly. All the councilors of the
unions in a district form the electoral college for the District Nazim. The electoral college
for the TMA Nazim is the membership of the unions in the TMA jurisdiction. The
Nazims can be recalled by a simple majority of the respective council.
Two rounds of elections to local governments have been held since 2001.
The councils at each level are empowered to approve budgets. No expenditure can
be carried out without the budgetary approval. District accounts are maintained by
provincial or federal accountants. The accounting forms for the districts have been
prescribed by the Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP). TMA accounting has yet to catch
up. The TMA accounts are managed by accountants within the TMA. An elaborate
system of audit is present at the district level with annual post audit of district accounts
carried out by the federal AGP. The TMA and union audit is carried out by a provincial
agency, the “Local Fund Audit”. The Accounts Committee of the council receives an
annual audit report for their respective executive and is empowered to hold it accountable
in light of the audit report.
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Local governments have a weak constitutional status. Despite a declaration in its
favor in the ‘Principles of Policy’ in the 1973 Constitution6, local government is treated
as a provincial subject being neither mentioned in the federal or concurrent list of
expenditure responsibilities. Provinces are technically unencumbered in the choice of
assignment of functions or revenues to local governments. Under a constitutional
provision, local governments created in 2001 are protected until the end of 2009 giving
them sufficient time to stabilize, i.e., they may not be abolished. In the last three decades,
local governments have paradoxically thrived under military governments but were
considerably weakened under democratic provincial governments (Monshipouri and
Samuel, 1995). The reasons for this are partly due to attempts by military governments at
engineering new political leadership through elected local governments. On the other
hand, the democratically elected provincial governments see local governments as
competitors at the constituency level. During the 1990s, local councils were disbanded
and the local bodies were managed by appointed provincial civil servants for varying
durations in the provinces.
The friction between provincial and local governments has been an ongoing
phenomenon as has been in the past (Cheema et al 2005). Since the creation of the new
local government system in 2001, the assignment of revenue, and the posting of officers
and other subjects have been contested fields. Provinces have exercised a close control
over the local budgetary functions, retaining establishment control, prescribing priorities
for local budgets and sometimes requiring ex-ante provincial approval for incurring
expenditures. In some cases the local functions have been centralized by the provinces. In

6

Article 32, Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Article 140 A also stipulates creation of local governments in
each province.
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2005, amendments to the law were made after an agreement between the provinces and
the federal government, which allowed provinces to unseat Nazims if they did not
perform well and prescribe developmental priorities for the local councils.
After the recent elections in February 2008, the newly elected provincial and
federal governments have once again raised questions about the local governments, their
mandate, activities, accounts and performance. Large scale centralization has been
actively debated in the press. The National Assembly has debated the future of local
governments with some of the members calling for their abolition. Provinces are also
debating abolition of the new local governments and some advocate reverting the system
to the 1979 law, which allowed most of the currently assigned functions like education,
health, roads and rural water supply to be directly performed by provincial organizations.

Fiscal Autonomy
Under the 2001 law local governments have been given expenditure autonomy
and revenue raising powers. Within their assigned functions, according to the legal
provisions, they can allocate funds to their priorities. In practice however, the provinces
exercise controls on expenditure. The controls are tighter on expenditure undertaken from
conditional transfers.
The districts have the largest imbalance between own source revenue and
expenditure, with only a fraction of their revenue raised locally. They are largely
dependent on provincial transfers. The data in Table 5 show that this pattern holds in all
the four provinces. In Punjab, it ranges from 76 to 91 percent of all district government
revenues being derived from provincial transfers in this illustrative sample of six districts.
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Karachi is the only district from Sindh for which data are available. The local tax revenue
of 20 percent of the total revenue is quite high by comparison with other districts in this
illustrative sample. But this is not likely representative of the revenue structure in other
Sindh districts. In Balochistan, local tax and non-tax revenues are nil except for Quetta,
which is the provincial capital as well as the only city district in the province. Unlike
Karachi, Quetta raises only 2 percent of its revenue from local taxes. Mardan and
Peshawar are the urban districts in NWFP. Again the local tax revenue is less than 2
percent of total revenue.
District governments have two tax collection agencies which have the capacity to
administer taxes. They are the district level formations of the provincial Excise and
Taxation Department and the provincial Board of Revenue. The District Excise and
Taxation Department collects provincial taxes including the property tax. The land
revenue department collects land revenue, mutation and registration fee and agricultural
income tax for the province. Other than these two departments, district governments
(except the city districts) do not have their own administratively developed tax collection
machinery for local taxes. These two departments are mainly concerned with collection
of provincial taxes. The provinces exercise varying degrees of control over the two
district departments, which are their main revenue collection agencies. They are
administratively, but in practice only nominally, part of the district government. In case
of the land revenue department, it functions as a component of the district. District
control varies in provinces with the NWFP BOR exercising direct authority over the
district offices. The district’s control over E&T is weak. Both agencies collect primarily

12
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provincial taxes7. The capacity of the two departments is fairly sound (Government of
Punjab, 2007a; Government of Punjab, 2007b). The district departments collect
provincial taxes according to the targets given by the provincial authorities. But since
none of the district levies has been assigned to these departments, the district’s tax
administration does not benefit itself. In addition to these two departments, in most cases
districts have inherited a weak tax collection establishment for local taxes from the earlier
District Councils. This staff focused mostly on zila tax (an export levy) and was not
trained appropriately. The staff now works under the Excise and Taxation Department in
the district.
The TMAs are better prepared to mobilize revenue than are the district
governments. The earlier local bodies had an own source revenue in the form of octroi
and zila tax. This tax was abolished in 1998. To compensate the local bodies, an
additional 2.5 percent was added to the federal GST rate8 and the income from this
addition to the rate was declared to create a hold harmless grant for the local bodies. The
rate increase became effective in 1999 but the replacement grant was not commissioned
until 2002. TMAs have since received a grant calculated as one-sixth of the total GST
collection by the federal government. Administration of the pass-through grant was
initially problematic because of deductions by the province prior to distribution. In the
last few years the grant has been streamlined and TMA revenues have become more
predictable as a result. The urban immovable property tax, another important levy, has
been assigned to the TMAs but administrative decentralization of the tax has yet to come
about. The revenue is currently shared between the district and the TMA following a

7
8

The notable exception in case of Land Revenue Department is Local Rate.
With this addition, the GST rate became 15 percent.
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15:85 ratio9. In the earlier decades, urban local bodies had accumulated experience of
administering other revenue items now sources of revenue for TMA. Systems and skills,
although weak, exist for local tax administration.
The data in Table 6 indicate the extent of TMA dependence on provincial and
federal transfers (in this illustrative sample of TMAs). The results show that TMAs in
more urban areas finance a large share of revenues from tax and non tax sources. In
general they are less dependent on intergovernmental transfers than are districts. In this
respect, TMAs more closely resemble a fiscally decentralized local government.
With respect to expenditures, local governments have legal autonomy for budget
making under the provincially mandated Local Government Budget Rules, 2002. The
rules lay out an elaborate system for budget preparation and approval by the local
councils. In practice, however, there are several constraints on expenditure allocation.
First, more than 90 percent of local expenditure is allocated to salaries. An overwhelming
number of the civil servants working in local governments are provincial or federal
employees, posted to them or assigned on deputation. Only a small fraction of staff are
local government’s own employees. Local governments have very little discretion in
determining the number of posts in each of their departments. Provincial finance
departments keep a close watch on the establishment size and the level of positions. The
creation of new positions requires prior provincial approval. The federal government
under the unified pay scale system lays down the basic salaries and increments for all
categories of employees. Provinces follow the federal announcements for salary raises.
Local governments are not legally bound to do so, but in practice departure from the

9

Section 118 lays out the collection and sharing principles (Government of Punjab, 2001).
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uniform pay scales is neither practical nor possible. Federal salary increase means an
immediate fiscal burden for the local governments. In the last 7 years, the federal
government has increased salaries three times. In one case, it translated into a 15 percent
increase in the local government salary budget.
Local governments do not have the authority to fire federal or provincial civil
servants. They can fire their own employees, which are a smaller fraction of the total.
Increasingly, the education and health sectors are moving toward fixed term contract
employment. These employees are hired at the local level and the local government can
fire them. However, their number and compensation packages are decided at the
provincial level.
In theory, capital budgets are less constrained and, the local governments can
allocate funds according to local priorities. In practice, a major fraction of the capital
grants flow to them with strict conditions attached. In recent years, development grants in
education and health specified the objects of expenditure in detail. In Punjab, grants were
only made available to local government in education, health and water supply after they
signed MoUs to carry out expenditures according to agreed conditions.
On the development side federal and provincial programs overlap local functions.
Both federal and provincial governments finance programs in education and health. They
vary in terms of the extent of central control over them (for details see Cyan and Porter,
2007). Most donor financed programs have followed an approach where local
governments have been given some discretion in expenditure choices, but provincial
level project offices play an active role in planning, project design, implementation,
accounts and accountability. The extent and nature of this control varies across sectors.

Local Government Taxation in Pakistan
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III. Pakistan’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Structure
Local governments (districts, TMAs, and Union Councils) are the bottom tier of
the intergovernmental fiscal system in Pakistan. Yet these governments are closest to the
people, hence are an important part of the fiscal decentralization strategy. To understand
their potential role in fiscal decentralization, it is necessary to understand both the
expenditure responsibilities and revenue-raising powers that they have been assigned, as
well as their intergovernmental transfer entitlements. We take up those issues in turn, in
the next three sections.
The issue is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to assess the operation of
provincial-local fiscal relations independent of an assessment of federal-provincial fiscal
relations. The budget constraint that each provincial government faces depends on the
amount of grant (award) passed down by the central government. The tighter the budget
constraint, the less likely it is that provincial governments will release more taxing
powers to local governments or increase their vertical share of transfers.

Expenditure Assignment
The key piece of legislation that underlies the intergovernmental fiscal system in
any country is the budget law or local government ordinance that lays out expenditure
assignment. This follows the Constitution but specifies the exact division of expenditure
responsibility between the levels of government. It is the expenditure assignments to each
level that allow us to evaluate the adequacy of both the revenue assignment and the
system of transfers.
The Constitution lays down a federal list of expenditure responsibilities, and a

16
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concurrent list. Residuary functions (functions that are on neither of these lists) become
the responsibility of the provincial government. The provincial government, in turn,
defines the expenditure responsibilities of the local governments in the local government
ordinances. This means that expenditure assignments can vary widely across provinces
depending on the extent that provincial governments wanted to use their third tier
governments in service delivery, i.e., depending on how committed the provinces are to
fiscal decentralization.
Provincial governments have two choices in this case: they may assign
responsibility for certain expenditures exclusively to the local governments, or they may
establish a “concurrent” list. Concurrency may mean that a function could be delivered
by either level, or that delivery of the service may be done jointly. Concurrency has the
strength of allowing the recognition of different service delivery abilities of different
levels of government. It has the weakness of not being a transparent approach and of
leading to possibility that a service may not get provided at all. Table 7 shows the
division of functions between the province and local government.

Revenue Assignment10
The Constitution in Pakistan lays down a separation of taxing powers. In general,
the provinces are denied access to the broad-based and more revenue productive income
and consumption taxes. These tax assignments have left the provinces with bases that are
hard to reach (the income tax on agriculture and the sales tax on services), or costly to
administer (the property tax). Some would argue that the Constitution also closes off

10

This section draws from Bahl, Wallace and Cyan, 2008.
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possibilities for tax base sharing by the federal and provincial levels of government.
India’s intergovernmental system is also built around the constitutional principle of
separation of tax bases (vs. concurrent taxing powers, as are allowed in many federal
countries) (Bahl, Heredia-Ortiz, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005).
The upper limit of the taxing power of local governments in a province is the
amount of revenue raising power that is given to the provincial government.

In fact,

very little revenue raising power rests with provinces hence the local governments will
also have a limited revenue raising capacity.

In neither case will taxes play a very

significant role in financing government expenditures.
Provincial and local government taxes are authorized by provincial acts and the
provincial governments have some authority to alter tax rates and bases and to administer
their own taxes. The tax structure and administration in the four provinces are similar in
many respects suggesting either a heavy central influence or some “copycat” behavior.11
While there are more than 15 tax sources available to the provincial governments,
most revenues in Punjab are derived from taxes on property transfers (including stamp
duties, mutation and registration fees) and from taxes on motor vehicles. In the case of
NWFP, motor vehicle taxes, property transfer taxes and the GST on services are the most
important own source revenues. The concentration of tax revenues may be illustrated by
the following. In Punjab, 8 of the 14 tax sources listed in Table 8 account for only 14
percent of the tax revenues. In NWFP, 8 of the tax sources listed account for only 10

11

Since the abolition of “one unit” governance in 1970, the provinces appear to have adopted Punjab tax
laws and followed the tax policy of Punjab. The Inter-provincial Coordination Committee also seeks tax
harmonization. The recent meeting of the provincial finance ministers also took place with a similar
objective (‘Provincial Finance Ministers to Discuss Vehicles Tax, The News, June 4, 2008).
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percent of the collections.12
Local governments are assigned their taxing powers by the province, and in fact,
these powers are very limited. There are no data available to measure the level of local
taxes, so we cannot say how small the amounts are. Moreover, we cannot provide a
catalogue the levies that each local government imposes, for the same reason. The taxes
that are known to be imposed are discussed in Section VI of this report.

Intergovernmental Transfers
Most local government financing is done through a system of intergovernmental
transfers, or grants. The system is well thought out and more or less meets the tests of a
transparent grant system. The awards in practice have not been very clear in some areas.
The particulars of the transfers (e.g., formulas and vertical shares) will vary from
Province to province, but in each case the basic structure is similar. Based on an
“illustrative” sample, we can say that transfers account for nearly all of the financing of
district governments, and from 60-80 percent of the financing on TMAs.
A provincial Finance Commission (PFC) in each province is charged with
designing the transfer system. A PFC comprises the Minister of Finance, Secretaries of
Finance, Planning and Local Government, three Nazims and three independent members
appointed by the Governor.
The PFC decides on the vertical share (transfers as a percent of total provincial
government expenditures), and on the formula for distributing the general purpose grant.
Once established, the award is effective for three years. Table 9 shows the vertical share

12

Bahl, Wallace and Cyan (2008)
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and the formula for each province.
In addition to the general purpose award, the line ministries in the provinces give
project grants. These are earmarked for specific purposes.
There is no incentive element built into these transfers to encourage revenue
mobilization, i.e., in no province is the award made conditional upon a target level of
revenue effort. In Sindh the PFC attempted to reward high tax jurisdictions but it is not
clearly applied to local tax effort.

IV. Principles for a Good Local Government Tax
Are there some generally accepted guidelines that can be useful in identifying the
“right” set of local government taxes in Pakistan? In fact, there are such guidelines, and
we might use these to both evaluate the practice in Pakistan and suggest the direction of a
reform program.
The traditional view about “a good local tax” is well summarized by Oates (1996,
page 36):
“(1) Lower levels of government…should, as much as possible, rely on benefit
taxation of mobile economic units, including households and mobile factors of
production. (2) To the extent that nonbenefit taxes need to be employed on mobile
economic units, perhaps for redistributive purposes, this should be done at higher
levels of …government. (3) To the extent that local governments make
use of
nonbenefit taxes, they should employ them on tax bases that are relatively
immobile across local jurisdictions.”
This view leads to a general recommendation that subnational governments
should choose immobile tax bases that are easily administrable. In many countries this is
taken to mean narrow-based taxes that are not revenue productive (and are of not much
interest to higher level governments).

20
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Where does this leave us in terms of some basic principles for choosing a “good”
local government tax? It does rule out certain taxes, but it does not help identify a viable
list for local governments.
To construct a list of taxes with potential for local governments in Pakistan, we
might go back to the basics of tax assignment, and look to the maxims by which
candidate local government taxes might be evaluated.

Most public finance economists

recite revenue adequacy, revenue neutrality, vertical equity, administrative feasibility,
“correspondence” and political feasibility as the goals. Less often observed is that a wellstructured subnational government tax will vary depending on whether the subject is a
province, a city or a rural local government. This is very much the issue in Pakistan.

Revenue Adequacy
The primary goal for local government taxation is to raise revenues.

This

suggests that the potential revenue source might be evaluated in terms of three “yield”
characteristics. First, the base should be broad enough so that adequate revenues can be
raised at a reasonable tax rate. An “adequate” level of revenues will depend on the
expenditure responsibilities that have been assigned to the local government. If the
provincial government in Pakistan has adopted fiscal decentralization as a development
strategy, and has assigned some important functions to district governments and TMAs, a
local government tax base that is cobbled together from the “minor” taxes –
entertainment, restaurants, signboards, etc. – will not be adequate to cover the service
delivery costs and guarantee the accountability of elected local officials.

Neither will

reliance on politically and administratively difficult taxes (e.g., agricultural income tax,
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property tax) allow provincial or urban local governments to move measurably closer to
becoming self-sufficient in terms of financing. Some form of broad-based tax will be
required for urban governments. The needs of rural local governments will be more
modest. The state of the practice in developing countries these days, however, is that
relatively few provincial or local governments have been assigned broad based taxes. In
most low income countries, local governments continue to be heavily reliant on
intergovernmental transfers.
Second, there should be automatic growth in the tax base that keeps up with the
target growth in expenditures. Without this level of elasticity to the base, the subnational
government tax base will not be able to support the required growth in the budget and it
will become necessary to return regularly to voters (or to the province) for approval of
new tax actions.
Third, and contrary to the above, it is frequently argued that subnational
government tax bases should be stable rather than cyclical, because subnational
governments support many essential local services. Moreover, subnational governments
cannot run deficits, so they do not have a borrowing route to smooth out erratic revenue
flows. Under the 2001 ordinances local governments are not allowed to raise debt. In the
case of Pakistan, the urban property tax presents such a case of instability, because the
revenue flow is dependent on revaluation which takes place in cycles.

Administration
A good subnational government tax will be administrable at a reasonable cost.
This is an especially binding constraint for local governments in Pakistan, and the smaller
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the local government unit, the more binding the constraint becomes. For example, the
property tax -- particularly the job of valuing parcels -- is notoriously hard to do and very
expensive if done right. The taxation of small business is also costly because it often is
not based on self-reporting systems and requires a great deal of field work in the
assessment and collection process13.
For some of the broad-based taxes that are levied on businesses (e.g., corporate
income tax, VAT), provincial or local government assignment in Pakistan is not possible
because of the book audit required in the tax administration. Local governments do not
have the personnel in place to carry out such tasks or the budgets to support such
personnel. Moreover, taxes on large business’ income or value-added are levied on a
firm basis rather than a plant basis and the tax administration cooperation required among
local governments would be next to impossible.
Local government tax administration costs are prohibitively high for some taxes.
This will not be true in other cases. This leaves us with the policy question of whether
there are possibilities for more effective and lower cost tax administration by local
governments? One might think of four ways for Provincial and local governments to
overcome their inherent disadvantages.
1. Subnational governments may only be assigned those tax bases that are most
easily administered. Provinces and some of the larger cities might concentrate on
individual income taxes, certain selective sales taxes, operating licenses for large
businesses and taxes on the use of motor vehicles. Smaller local governments
would concentrate on levies on shops, motor vehicles, factories, registered
professionals, and property.
2. Administrative costs may be kept in check by limiting the number of taxes
included in the system. In a sometimes desperate search for revenues, local
13

For a good discussion of the complications of presumptive taxes on small businesses, see Engelschalk
(2004).
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governments will pile on many specific local levies. These tend to be costly to
collect and sometimes arbitrary in their administration. .
3. Subnational governments might find ways to compensate for what otherwise
would be an expensive tax administration cost. An example is shortcuts to
administering the property tax which might include substituting tax mapping
based on site visits for expensive aerial mapping, or using area-based assessments
instead of more sophisticated approaches based on comparative values.
4. There is the possibility that local governments could piggyback on the tax base of
the higher level governments thereby avoiding any tax administration
responsibility. A good example would be a provincial government surcharge on
the central government individual income tax. This is an important point. The
path to a stronger local government fiscal position may involve first strengthening
the provincial government’s taxing powers and tax administration.

Correspondence between Benefits and Burdens
If a local government is able to export its taxes to those in other jurisdictions, then
its residents will vote to overspend relative to the taxes that they pay. While this situation
is the dream of local politicians, it leads to an efficiency loss that is not in the national
interest. Residents in the tax importing jurisdiction, on the other hand, will vote a budget
that is commensurately lower than the total local government taxes that they pay.
The “correspondence” principle would limit local government tax choices to those
where burdens cannot be exported. More precisely, we should say that those who receive
the benefits of local government expenditures should bear the burden of the taxes levied
by that local government. This might raise a number of interesting issues in Pakistan.
For example, local government would not be allowed to levy a sales tax on a factory that
sells its product outside the local area (e.g., cigarettes) or on services whose tax burden
might be exported (imported processing.

On the other hand, a non-resident who

commutes into the province to work could be charged (a portion of) a provincial payroll
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tax, or non-residents who shop in city markets could pay the local consumption tax on the
grounds that they use city services.
This principle of correspondence cannot be completely followed, because there is
some exporting of nearly all taxes. The question is one of degree. For example, a portion
of the property tax – that levied on firms who sell in national markets or are owned by
non-residents – is probably exported. This is a small error, by comparison, say, with
allowing a local government to levy an excise tax on a cigarette factory that sells in a
national market.

Vertical Equity
Local governments are probably ill-advised to structure their tax system so as to
distribute tax burdens toward rich and away from poor residents. There are a number of
reasons for this advice. First, income redistribution is a component of national social
policy in Pakistan, and is best approached through the federal tax system. Second, local
government pursuit of redistribution through the tax system is likely to be thwarted by
migration and tax compliance problems. Third, the expenditure side of the budget might
be the better route to dealing with the status of low income families.
Local governments in Pakistan might do better to deal with the vertical equity
issues in the following way.
Treat all taxes as a user charge for services delivered, a kind of benefit tax. If
there is to be a distributional consideration, it could be to minimize any additional tax
burdens on those below the poverty line. This might lead to a decision to exempt the
lowest value premises from the property tax, to not impose taxes or charges that would
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deny the very poor access to basic services, and to consider cross subsidization in setting
user charge rates so as to protect those families with incomes below the poverty level.

Moving Ahead?
The reform of the local government tax system is a tall order, especially in
Pakistan where the administrative capacity of most local governments is weak and there
is an absence of a tax paying culture. One might consider a phased approach. Certainly
the greatest need would be for the larger urban governments, because their service
delivery needs are greater, their taxable capacity is greater, and their tax administration is
stronger. A goal of public policy ought to be to make these local governments more selffinancing than others. Rural local governments can develop their fiscal systems with the
more traditional local taxes, including the property tax, and with user charges, fees and
intergovernmental transfers. In most developing countries, there is not the expectation
that rural local governments will become financially self-sufficient.

The same

expectation should hold in Pakistan.

V. The International Practice
The most important reason why provincial and local government taxing powers
are limited is the unwillingness of higher level governments to give up control over
productive tax bases. The underlying reason is this: revenue mobilization is a significant
problem in developing countries, and the fiscal needs of provincial and local
governments are often seen as a lower priority issues.
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The result of this tax competition is that subnational governments are often
assigned the least productive and sometimes the most difficult-to-administer taxes, e.g.,
property taxes, agricultural income taxes, entertainment taxes, etc. The result is not
unexpected. The subnational government share of total government taxes is only about
10 percent in developing countries. The share of local (third-tier) governments is much
lower.

Tax Choices: Urban Local Governments
Urban local governments have a significant tax base and therefore an ability to
mobilize a significant amount of revenue from local tax sources. Typically, they are
home to a substantial share of the national economy and they often have developed an
administrative infrastructure that is strong enough to impose modern taxes. In many
countries, the largest cities have been given provincial status. However, their boundaries
tend to be much smaller than those for most provinces, hence tax assignment is more
constrained by correspondence concerns. The practice of local revenue powers in large
cities is suggested by the examples in Table 10.

Income and Payroll Taxes. Local governments in urban areas could impose
income or payroll taxes. These would fall primarily on workers in the formal sector,
therefore would be administratively feasible. An income tax could provide a revenueproductive and elastic base. It would be administratively feasible if imposed as an addon to a federal government income tax, i.e., as a piggyback income tax. The piggyback
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could be on the federal government tax base or on federal government tax liability. Both
forms are used by state and local governments in U.S. states.
Urban local governments could administer a payroll tax, which would be
collected at source from the formal sector of the economy.

Collections could be

facilitated by information sharing with the federal taxing authority. There would be no
requirement for filing in this case. Even if the tax were to be locally administered,
collection efficiency could be enhanced by information sharing on the tax base.
With respect to the correspondence problem, a problem would arise because of
workers who commute in to the city. Because the tax would be collected at the place of
work (for administrative reasons), commuters will pay the same tax as resident-workers,
but would receive a lesser set of expenditure benefits. Another knock on the local
income taxes is that they raise the price of labor and therefore may discourage job growth
in the city. Probably the biggest pull back on urban local government payroll taxes is that
higher level governments would see this as encroachment on an important central tax
base.
Local government income taxes are used in the United States and in some other
industrialized countries. Slack (2006, p.106-107) reports that income taxes represent the
most important source of local tax revenues in 13 of the 27 OECD countries. However,
they are used only infrequently in the developing countries. A subnational government
income tax is probably more appropriate as a provincial government levy in developing
countries. However, this would open the possibility of a piggyback form of revenue
sharing with the urban local governments.
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South Africa’s RSC levy is a combination payroll tax and turnover tax and
accounts for a significant share of revenues in some large cities. In aggregate, this tax
accounted for about 2 percent of total national government revenues, with about one-third
of this coming from the payroll tax (Bahl and Solomon, 2003). The RSC levy comprised
about one-third of local government revenues in Capetown and about 20 percent in
Johannesburg. Though the RSC levy was revenue productive, this was in spite of bad
design and virtually no coordination with the central government income tax or
consumption tax.14
East African local governments have levied a tax on presumptive incomes
according to a graduated rate schedule that is laid down by the central government. This
tax is still levied in Uganda, though it has been declining in importance. It has been
abolished in Kenya and Tanzania.
Despite this sparing use of income and payroll taxes for provinces and
metropolitan cities, the case for their adoption is strong.

Many students of

intergovernmental finance in developing and transition countries have called for more
consideration of piggyback income taxes (Bahl and Wallich, 1995, p. 367; McLure,
Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace, 1999; and Bahl, 1999).
Consumption Taxes. Consumption taxes are a difficult proposition, even for large
city governments. In developing countries, retail sales taxes are not administratively
feasible.

Gross receipts taxes levied on an origin basis can be revenue productive, but

create distortions by shifting tax burdens from producing to consuming regions.

14

As of FY 2007, the RSC levy is abolished in South Africa, and replaced for a two year period with a
compensating grant.

Local Government Taxation in Pakistan

29

Relatively few large urban governments in the developing world rely heavily on sales
taxes.
There are however, some exceptions. Buenos Aires, both city and province, rely
heavily on a gross receipts tax. The tax rate varies widely by type of product. In
Nicaragua, the local gross receipts tax is levied at a rate of 1 percent. Colombian
municipalities also derive most of their revenue from a gross receipts tax. South African
cities have derived a significant amount of revenue from a combination payroll and
turnover tax. All of these taxes are levied on an origin basis, so all are guilty of the tax
exporting charge. In fact, for years there have been calls for replacing the gross receipts
tax in Buenos Aires with a value added tax.
Some urban local governments in South Asia have raised significant revenue from
the Octroi which is a combination of sales tax and terminal tax. It is levied on goods
entering the city, according to a complicated rates schedule, and is collected at Octroi
stations. It has posed compliance costs on sellers (the queries at the Octroi posts can
cause long delays) and invited corruption.

Nevertheless, the Octroi was revenue

productive, e.g., 50 percent of revenues for the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The
Octroi has now been abolished in all but three Indian states and in Bangladesh15.
Taxes on Motor Vehicle Use.

Motor vehicle use is an excellent source of

taxation for urban local governments. The growth in cars, trucks, and motorcycles
exceeds the growth in population in many cities and accounts for a significant amount of
discretionary spending. Several forms of taxing motor vehicle use meet the tests for good
local taxes.

15

As noted above, in Pakistan octroi was abolished in 1998.
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Certainly tolls and parking taxes can generate revenues and directly charge motor
vehicle use. Motor vehicle licenses can be more revenue productive if levied at high
enough rates and if authority to levy these can be wrestled away from high level
governments.
The prize as a revenue source for local governments would be the tax on motor
fuels.

It would be revenue productive and revenue elastic, and it might be

administratively feasible in most developing country cites if collected from distributors.
It would ideally be a destination tax with rates varying among cities, and this might
induce some fuel carrying hence there would be some avoidance problems.
Taxes on motor fuels are a component of revenue systems in many large urban
areas in developing countries.

Surprisingly, however, they have not come to be a

dominant component of the revenue system. This is in part because they are constrained
by central government hesitation to allow any encroachment on its petroleum excise base,
in part because fuel prices are so sensitive a political issue that the center desires
complete control, and in part because local governments themselves are hesitant to take
on the political cost that might come with heavier taxation of motor vehicle use.
Property and Land Taxes. The property tax is the mainstay of local government
finance in most countries. It fits the criteria for a proper local government tax, is not
usually coveted by higher level governments, and it is accepted by taxpayers in
developing countries as long as rates remain relatively low. Land values are soaring in
many metropolitan areas, and have been for many years, hence the property tax revenue
take should be lucrative.
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Revenues. Some countries make heavy use of the property tax, and do make a
high property tax effort. For example, Canada raises a revenue amount equivalent to
about 4 percent of GDP, and the United States raises nearly 3 percent of GDP. The share
of GDP raised from property taxes in developing countries is many times lower, as may
be seen from the comparisons in Table 11.
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) have studied the question of what
characteristics of a country lead to more use of the property tax. Using a sample of 45
developing, transition and industrialized countries for the late 1990s, they find that the
“effective property tax rate” is significantly higher in higher income countries, more
populous countries and countries with a greater degree of urbanization. If a country has a
10 percent higher level of GDP, cet. par., the effective property tax rate is expected to be
4 percent higher. A 10 percent higher urbanization rate is associated with a 1.7 percent
higher effective property tax rate. While all countries are not reported in this comparison,
the results are telling: the property tax might be a mainstay of local government revenue
systems in developing countries, but it does not dominate revenue raising. Moreover, this
same analysis shows relatively little growth relative to GDP, so we might also conclude
that despite growth in property values, it has not been buoyant.
The average effective rate of property tax in developing countries is less than 0.5
percent of GDP. As a share of subnational government revenue, it is about 12 percent.
This does not mean that the property tax is not able to carry a significant portion
of local government expenditures. It does in some cities in developing countries (Table
12). Certainly the base of land and/or improvement value is broad enough to generate
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significant revenue at a low rate. From a revenue standpoint, the property tax may be the
most underused source of revenue at the local government level.
Administration. The property tax is difficult, and costly, to administer well.
However, it is one tax where local governments have a comparative advantage in several
facets of the tax administration.
•

Identification of taxpayers requires regular tax mapping of parcels, which
benefits greatly from local knowledge. The same is true of ownership
patterns, which can be learned from local records.

•

Recordkeeping requires a tracking of new building activity, and land use
changes that are linked to local regulatory activity.

•

Assessment requires local knowledge of changing value patterns within
the metropolitan area.

•

Collection may be the one area where the local government has a
comparative disadvantage. Because its elected officers are closer to the
voters, enforcement – particularly in cases of the local powerful – may be
especially difficult.

Correspondence. The burden of residential property taxes is generally borne by
local residents. Certainly for the owner-occupied housing part of the tax base, the
correspondence test is passed. This is also the case for most rented residential properties,
though some absentee landlords may bear some of the burden in the form of a reduced
rate of return on their investment. For non-residential taxpayers, the issue is whether they
sell their product in local or external markets. To the extent the local property tax base
exempts residential properties, and many do, a greater portion of the tax may be exported.
Pakistan is a case-in-point. In general, however, the property tax might be seen as a
reasonable way to charge for benefits received from local services.
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Other Property Taxes. Some countries allow local governments to raise money
from property transfer taxes. This can be a lucrative source of revenue, because land
sales in many countries can be a significant share of GDP. However, where levied,
property transfer taxes do not account for a great deal of money for local governments,
usually because of undervaluation of the sales base. A criticism of property transfer taxes
is that they impede land transactions, and provide an incentive for buyers and sellers to
understate transaction values, thus depriving the local property assessor of accurate
information about local land markets16.
Local governments can also tax land in other ways. In particular, betterment
levies of various kinds are an effective way to recapture the cost of infrastructure
expenditures from beneficiaries.

The principle here is simple.

A benefit zone is

identified for an infrastructure project, and the cost of the project is recovered from
beneficiaries by some formula and over a period of years. Though many countries have
such levies on the books, they are not widely used.

Tax Choices: Small Municipalities and Rural Local Governments
Revenue mobilization by small local governments is a special challenge. Their
potential tax base is narrow and mostly in the informal sector, and their experience with
tax administration is very limited. Things are made even more complicated by the
absence of a culture of paying taxes, and by the fact that these governments may provide
little public service benefits in return for tax payment.

Inevitably, most of their

expenditure budget will be financed by intergovernmental transfers.

16

For a discussion, see Bird and Slack (2004).
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Nevertheless, independent taxing powers are important for smaller and rural local
governments because it is necessary to make local officials accountable, just as in the
case of urban local governments.

Many countries have recently begun a push to

stimulate local self-governance in the rural sector17. A reasonable goal in such countries
is to get rural local governments on the learning curve for fiscal decentralization,
including upgrades in local tax practices.
Property and Land Taxes. The property tax in rural areas will be much more
rudimentary than that levied in urban areas, and likely will yield very little when viewed
as a share of GDP. As a share of local government revenue, however, it may be quite
important. The obvious revenue constraint is that the local population has little capacity
to pay, but there is also the problem of little local skill in administering a property tax,
especially with respect to valuation. On the other hand, there are some comparative
advantages that small local governments might have in this area, and some administrative
“shortcuts” that they might take.
•

Because the community is small, mapping of all parcels might be
accurately and easily done.

•

Assessment might be done on a basis of physical area, rather than value,
so as to minimize skill requirements in the valuation process.

•

Small communities might be able to use peer pressure along with penalties
to enforce collections.

Taxpayers might see more easily the linkage between what they pay and the benefits they
receive, hence there might be less resistance to paying taxes than in urban places.
Some of the practice is reviewed in Table 13.

17

For a discussion of the India case, see Sethi (2005).
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Businesses might be subjected to a license tax on grounds

that they generally benefit from doing business in the local government area. These
benefits might include the use of city roads, sanitation facilities, an education and health
system that leads to more productive workers, a recreation system that makes the city
more livable and attracts business, etc. Because these are general benefits, compensation
in the form of a tax is more feasible than compensation in the form of a user charge.
Business licenses therefore can meet the correspondence test, and depending on the rate
of tax, can contribute a meaningful amount of revenue.
There are two major problems with business license taxes. The first is that they
may impose compliance costs that are large enough to drive away would-be investors.
The second is that they tend to be arbitrary in both design and administration and so they
are too easily captured by corrupt administrators. Bird (1999) and McLure (1998) have
argued that these are not good benefit charges, and that as taxes they are distortionary.
In fact, smaller local governments do make use of business license taxes and in
some cases these have become revenue mainstays.

In the Philippines, municipal

governments levy a business license tax that is based on the estimated gross sales of the
firm. It is a rough version of a presumptive tax, and yields about 10 percent of local
government revenue18. An important local business tax in Fracophone Africa is the
patente. These are fixed local taxes based on type of activity, number of employees,
square meters of premises, inputs used, etc. (Vaillancourt, 1998). The idea is for this to
be an easily administered local tax, but in practice it tends to be complicated and costly to
administer correctly. An interesting approach to business licensing is in Kenya where a

18

Table 2 in UNESCAP, 2007.
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single business permit has been introduced (Devas and Kelly, 2001). The idea is to
minimize compliance costs on businesses by requiring only one license, and to generate
revenue by applying a standard, graduated tariff schedule. In effect, it is a kind of
presumptive tax on sales or profitability.
Personal Taxes and Head Taxes.

Many smaller local governments (and some not so

small governments) levy personal taxes. In its simplest form, it is a head tax. The appeal
is that it does not require significant administrative skill, and it is a way to get the
population involved in the culture of tax payment. This tax generates relatively small
amounts of revenues.
A more sophisticated version of the head tax is the graduated personal tax (GPT)
as has been levied in some east African countries. The Ugandan GPT has been an
important source of revenue for both urban and rural local governments. The tax is
levied according to a progressive rate schedule on incomes earned by adult males and
adult working females. The assessment of income in the rural areas is notional. The
assessment of the self-employed is on a notional basis. A committee is delegated to visit
each village, and the members of the committee include the local chief and/or some
elders. They visit each house, and fill out a form enumerating the wealth of the taxpayer.
The local participation on the committee assures that the wealth is not under-declared.
They use the assessment manual provided by MLG showing the notional value to be
placed on a particular item of wealth, e.g., each head of a particular type of livestock
translates into some level of income.
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Special Issues
Some special issues have arisen with respect to local government taxation, and
there is debate about how these should be viewed.

These special issues include

subnational government businesses, natural resource taxes and tax incentives.
Local Government Businesses.

Particularly

rural

local

governments

sometimes generate revenues by operating commercial businesses. The idea is that the
“profit”, after covering all costs, can be viewed as a net contribution to the local
government revenue stream. There are numerous examples of such enterprises ranging
from game parks to hotels to commercial shops. Are local government enterprises a good
option for local revenue mobilization? The answer here is that they probably are not19.
A first question is whether these local government businesses actually generate
revenue. While it might be true that they can show a net profit, it might not be true that
this is net revenue to government. The problem is that some costs of operations might be
hidden, and more properly ought to be netted out against this profit number. Among the
possibilities for hidden or subsidized costs of operations are:
•

overheads such as accounting services or personnel system support that
might be provided by government, just as in the case of any other
operating department,

•

The provision of infrastructure on a preferential basis for government
enterprises, and possibly even subsidized rents in the land that might be
provided.

•

Wage payments might be lower because of the greater job security that
comes with a quasi-government position.

Another way to think about the revenue gain is in terms of the opportunity costs of a
government business. It may crowd out private investment, thereby making the private
19

For a more in-depth discussion, see Kitchen (2006).
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tax base smaller than it would otherwise be. The absence of a level playing field in terms
of competition – there may even be an implied subsidy to cover any losses of the
government firm – will discourage private investors form entering this market.
Natural Resource Taxes.

Should local governments be allowed to tax the

extractive sector? The simple answer is that they should, but with significant constraints
placed upon them. The basic methods of taxing the extractive sector – personal and
corporate income taxes, VAT, trade taxes – should remain with central government, as
dictated by basic tax administration considerations.
Local governments could participate by raising fees and charges from the
extractive sector.

However, this should be done within the general framework of

allowable local government revenue-raising. Fees and charges should be general levies
on all businesses, and should be aimed at recouping some of the cost of providing
services. The targeting of one firm or one sector, for the purpose of exporting burdens,
should be prohibited.
Some policy analysts have concentrated on identifying taxes that can be applied
specifically to the natural resources sector. In an interesting analysis of the options for
local taxation of mining activities, Otto (2001) suggests that good candidates might
include royalties based on a unit assessment, licensing fees, surface rentals or land use
fees, stamp duties, property tax and user fees. In terms of actual practice, he finds that
property tax is the only levy on this list that is commonly used.
None of this is to say that subnational governments should be excluded from
revenue sharing on natural resources. There are strong arguments to support this strategy
(Bahl and Tumennasan, 2004). But a combination of the cyclical nature of the receipts,
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tax administration concerns and the possibility of tax exporting all point away from
allocating broad based taxes on natural resources to subnational governments.

VI. Local Government Taxation in Pakistan: District Governments
District governments control the larger number of employees and incur the major
fraction of local government expenditures. Important functions include elementary and
secondary education, basic health, district roads, agriculture extension and social welfare.
No comprehensive study has been carried out to document the extent to which districts
can finance their own expenditures, but individual studies have shown that the gap
between expenditures and locally raised revenue is very large. At the end of 1990s, it was
around 97 percent (ADB/DfID/WB 2004). In recent years, the situation has not changed
much. The districts continue to be largely dependent on provincial transfers for financing
their services and the gap remains above 90 percent20.
Our illustrative sample also shows that the transfers in all the four provinces make
up the major source of revenue for the districts. The data in Table 14 provides a glimpse
into the district revenues. The tax revenues finance less than 2 percent of expenditure for
all districts except Karachi, which is a special case. Note that Lahore, Quetta and
Peshawar city districts do not show the same pattern as Karachi. The non-tax revenue
makes up another 0.2 to 5 percent of the district expenditure. The cases examined here
indicate that the district governments in all the four provinces, with the exception of
Karachi, have very little taxes.
In the following paragraphs we discuss individual district taxes and sources of

20

A rough figure given by Finance Department, Government of Punjab.
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revenue.

Education tax
The schedule to Local Government Ordinances allows the districts to levy an
education tax, but provides no description of the rate or base for this tax. The rationale for
the creation of this levy was twofold: (i) The districts suffer from a great mismatch
between expenditure responsibility and revenue assignments, and this tax has been
created to provide a source of revenue to the districts. (ii) Failure of service delivery was
a major cause for Pakistan’s decentralization. Inclusion of an education tax, a tax to
finance education, was presumably a political statement to emphasize the function in the
new scheme.
The education tax has not been developed so far. Sporadic attempts have been
made by some urban districts at levying it (more description below), but it does not
appear as a source of revenue in any of the districts surveyed for this study.
Base and Rate of Tax. Since the Ordinance does not specify a tax base, local
governments would appear to be free to determine one based on local preferences. In
some urban districts, where an attempt to levy the tax has been made, the councils have
used enrollments in private schools or revenues of private schools as the above. The
rationale here is that private education is elitist and therefore a good target for taxation on
equity grounds. Another view is that private schools are addressing the large scale failure
of the public sector to provide adequate schooling. There are many types of private
schools. Some charge high fees and putatively provide high quality education. Others
charge low fees and provide education that is only marginally better than the public
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schools. A whole range of schools lies between these two extremes.
Quite predictably, the parents who send their children to private schools are from
higher income percentiles than those whose children go to public schools. But this will
not apply to all schools in the private category21.
In 2007, City District Government Karachi considered levying an education tax
on private schools to finance improvement of education in the city’s public schools22.
From the reports it seemed the intended tax base was the gross income of the private
schools.
Other views expressed by government officials are that the education tax is not
meant to be a tax on education. Therefore, private schools should not be taxed. Instead
commercial units and industry in district jurisdictions should be taxed more heavily than
at present with the revenues earmarked for education.
Private school income is taxed under the federal income tax. Collection is low and
reportedly there is large scale evasion in the federal income tax, similar to other sectors23.
Since the tax has not yet developed, statutory rates have not been documented for
the cases where it has been attempted. In Karachi the rates being discussed 1 percent of
the fee per enrolled student.
Tax Administration.

The identification of those liable for payment of the

education tax will depend on the tax base that is chosen.
If the tax is levied on private schools then identification of tax paying units will
be carried out by the district education departments.
This will raise the question of record keeping and determination of liability. As
21

I need to add a reference here; possibly give numbers from a WB study
“New Tax on Education, Health Prior to Budget”, The Daily Times, Lahore, June , 2007.
23
It is not specific to private schools.
22
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discussed above, the district level does not have a well developed tax collection
department. The record keeping of private schools is done by the district education
department which exercises a loose supervision. It is not clear if the liability will be
determined on the basis of school records. Enrolment is not always accurately reported.
If the tax is instead levied on commercial units and industry then E&T department will be
a better choice, since it administers the provincial excise and property tax. Assignment of
this responsibility to the Zila Council staff also has been discussed.
No mechanism for collection has been proposed. The likelihood is that it will be
patterned after business license fee collections. Tax liability notices could be sent to the
tax payers once a year and tax could be collected by field inspectors of the E&T or Zila
Council staff.

Health tax
The health tax is a second proposed new instrument in the local government law.
It would be assigned to district governments. As in the case of the education tax, the
health tax has not been developed by the provincial government or by local practice. The
choices discussed so far include a tax on the receipts of private hospitals. Due to the low
quality service in general in the public sector hospitals, people from higher income
groups seek medical attention from private clinics and hospitals. At the same time, for
tertiary care, people from lower income groups also seek consultation at private clinics
for want of another choice when public sector facility is not available or is performing at
a very low level. The equity case for taxing privately produced medical services is not at
all clear.
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The present tax on services -- levied by provincial governments -- does not include
charges levied by private clinics. Physician’s income is income is taxed under the federal
personal income tax, though coverage might be expected. Doctors are also taxed under
the provincial tax on professions and callings, through the rates are very low. In short,
the health tax, much like the education tax, appears to be little more than an idea. It is not
even clear if it is meant to be a tax on health services or a tax to benefit health services.
Until the intent of the ordinance is fleshed out, little can be said about rate, base or
administration.

Local rate on land assessable to land revenue
A local rate is levied on agricultural land. Agricultural plots below the size of 12 1/2 acres are exempt from paying land revenue. But the local rate is payable on all such
lands as well as the larger farms. The actual cultivation of land does not matter for this
levy.
Base Rate: Farms owned by individuals or legal persons form the base for this
tax. The tax is levied on a per acre basis.
The tax is levied at a flat rate of 2 rupees per acre. The rate has not been revised in
the last many years. The rate is set at the provincial level. Local governments do not have
any discretion in setting the rate. It is not clear that if this is due to a legal provision or
because the local governments have never exercised their discretion. This is an important
pint because if the local government has no rate-setting power, this levy is effectively an
intergovernmental transfer from the provincial government.
Administration. Land records for rural land are maintained by the patwari using
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an archaic system of measurement and record keeping. For every village, records are
prepared through a process called ‘settlement’. During settlement each parcel of land is
measured, its soil quality assessed and it is given a unique number. At the same time
ownership, occupancy and usufruct rights are recorded. Under the law settlement should
be carried out every 25 years but in practice it happens at much longer intervals. The
communal land in the villages is given separate numbers. It is jointly owned by the land
owners in the village. Parcels of land are identified in the patwari registers, specially the
four yearly jamabandi and khasra girdawari. The khasra is updated every six months by
field inspections.
Between settlements, the records are updated every four years in the form of new
editions of records of rights or jamabandi, incorporating changes in ownership and
occupancy, taking place on account of inheritance or sale. Each four yearly edition of the
records is formally maintained, with copies placed at more than one location, including
special purpose record rooms, to protect its authenticity. The records keep up to date
information of ownership and occupancy. Patwari maintains the records.
Tax liability is determined according to the ownership in the record of rights by
the patwari. The tax is payable by the land owners. The Patwari calculates the liability
when preparing the dhal bhach, or the tax demand for other land taxes.
The field officers of the land revenue department, patwaris, carry out the
collection. Collection is made twice a year, at the end of each cropping season. A demand
notice is handed over to the owners, mostly through personal service. It lists the amounts
due on account of different land taxes. The collection is made by the patwari by receiving
cash payments from the land owners and depositing it in the government accounts.
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Patwari calculates the amount which he has collected on account of the local rate and
deposits the local rate in designated accountsly. Currently the revenue is deposited in the
provincial account from where it is transferred to the district.

Business license tax
Under the local government ordinances, districts have been allowed to levy tax in
the form of a business license fee. The district governments charge this fee to allow the
privilege of conducting business in its jurisdiction. A similar fee is also levied by the
TMA. After 2001, initially it was not clear which business will be taxed by each tier and
whether the same business could be taxed by both. In 2003 Punjab Local Government
Taxation Rules have specified the businesses separately for each tier.
Base and Rate. The business licence tax is levied on a unit basis.comprehensive data are
not available on rates, but the rates are generally low and are rarely above Rs.300 per
annum. Some large industrial units are taxed at a higher rate, though in some case
provincial governments have disallowed high rates.
Administration. Systematic surveys of business activity are not carried out. The staff
assigned to the tax administration compiles information progressively and periodically
makes addition to the records. These are kept manually in the form of a register.
Tax liability is determined on an annual basis. A notice is sent to the business
owner. Field inspectors, generally one or two for the entire jurisdiction in a typical rural
district, collect the amounts by personal visits. The business owners can deposit the fee at
the tax collection office as well. Compliance is ensured by requiring display of a business
licence on the premises. Default is prosecuted in the court. Evidence suggests that
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prosecutions have been attempted in some districts. But pursuing prosecution is costly.
Since 2001, after the abolition of executive magistrates the ordinary civil and criminal
courts do no assign priority to the cases entailing minor liability. Cases remain pending
for long durations as result. In many cases, local governments have not taken this course.
It is a difficult tax to administer for the local governments. Identification and
record keeping are not systematic and estimates for the base are not available.

Tolls
Districts have been allowed to collect tolls on roads and bridges constructed and
maintained by them. They do not collect tolls on important roads or bridges that are
maintained by the province. Districts like Faisalabad levied tolls in the first three years
after the new system was put in place. But in some cases, the tolls were disallowed by the
provincial government later on. They are a small source of revenue for the districts where
they are levied. Collection is generally through contractors. The districts do not have
accurate estimates of the potential collections based on traffic counts on any point. The
reserve price for the bids is set keeping the historical collections in view. In many cases,
complaints are received against the contractors for overcharging.

User charges
User charges are mainly collected from school and health facilities, where they
are applicable. Provincial governments have made primary education free for all
residents, hence no fee is charged in secondary and higher schools. Health institutions
charge a basic fee. The rates are generally low. Higher rates apply to diagnostic facilities
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and tertiary health care. A large number of charges are recovered from services provided
by agriculture, land revenue, roads and forestry departments. The total amount collected
from these departments is not a major fraction of the district revenue.

VII.

Local Government Taxation in Pakistan: Tehsil Municipal Administrations
Fiscal decentralization reform has assigned new revenues to TMAs as well as

retained taxes and other revenue items from the earlier belonged to the urban local
governments. Table 15 shows two illustrative cases. The two cases in Table 15 show that
most of the TMA in Sukhar revenue comes in the form of grants from the province (83
percent). The major component of this revenue is the replacement grant for octroi. This is
generated from the collection of GST at the federal level. One-sixth of the GST on goods
is placed in separate pool. The pool is distributed among the provinces according to their
shares in the baseline collection of octroi and zila tax in 1998. The shares determined in
2006 through the interim NFC are given in Table 16.
Own revenue for TMAs varies with the ratio of urbanization and other tax base
endowments. In the illustrative cases is it 60 percent in Sialkot, which is a highly
urbanized thriving industrial city. This is an important pint because if the local
government has no rate-setting power, this levy is effectively an intergovernmental
transfer from the provincial government. But in Sukhar in rural Sindh it is close to 17
percent of total revenue. In another study the share of own revenue varies between 10 and
88 percent of the TMA revenue24. Similar variations are present among TMAs in other
provinces and within Sindh and Punjab. The grant system presently does not take into

24

Table 7 in Shah et al 2006.
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account these differences.
Most of the TMA tax bases are located in urban areas. Property tax has been
extended to rural areas but it is not levied on agricultural land. Other taxes and fees are
collected in the urban areas. Most TMA services are provided to the urban residents
within the TMA. TMA taxes are sometimes set up with an intra-jurisdictional
correspondence. In TMAs with large rural populations, since 2001 the new capital
investments now are gravitating toward rural areas. This imbalance between expenditure
demands and revenues generated has raised concerns for maintaining adequate
investment in urban infrastructure.
Some of the TMA tax bases are volatile e.g., cattle markets. It is the major source
of own revenue for TMA Attock. But these can vary between seasons and at times from
year to year.

Property tax
Property tax is levied on immovable property. In 2001 local government laws
assigned the tax to the TMA but in practice it is shared between the province, district and
TMA (Cyan, 2007). The TMA receives the major share of collection. This is an
important source of revenue for the TMAs. But due to administrative issues it is yet to
achieve its full potential for the TMAs. In the 12 illustrative cases in Table 17, it accounts
for 0.1 to 28 percent of the total TMA revenue. It is predictably a low percentage in rural
TMAs (Bhalwal, Sukhar, Barshore, Qilla Abdullah, Charsadda and Nowshera) and a
higher percentage in urban TMAs (Attock, Gulberg Town, Sialkot, Liaqatabad Town,
Zarghoon Town and Mardan). Even within the rural and urban groups, however, there is
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considerable variation.
Rate and Base. In all the four provinces, the tax is levied on urban immovable
property and it does not include agricultural land. Specifically, the definition includes
only urban property in the base. The local government laws now include all rural housing
estates in the base as zero rated areas. Annual rental value is used for tax base
computation. Property is classified into different categories and then size of plot and
covered area are used to determine the annual rental value. The calculation of the base
varies across provinces.
The tax rates vary across provinces but not among TMAs in a province. In some
TMAs however only certain bands of rates apply.
Administration. The District Excise & Taxation Department carries out five
yearly surveys to document each parcel of land in the tax rated areas (earlier these areas
were called ‘urban areas’). The surveys comprise physical visits to property units as well
as desk assessment. Property characteristics such as covered area, quality of construction,
number of bath rooms are documented by interviewing the owners or occupants.
Sometimes historical records are used. The details of each unit are recorded in registers.
The department identifies each unit with a distinct number.
Manual records are maintained by the departments. In most cases the registers are
maintained in iron cabinets. Punjab is now considering computerization of the
departmental records.
Tax payers deposit a tax amount in the bank and receive two copies of the
payment receipt. One is mailed to the department while the other is kept by the tax payer.
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Tax on transfer of property
Two departments deal with transfer of property: the registrar and the land revenue
department. The registrar attests the transfer deeds and collects the provincial registration
fee in urban areas. He can register any kind of immovable property transaction, but
generally the registration pertains to urban property. In urban areas there is no formal
mechanism for maintaining property records except in planned jurisdictions developed by
municipal authorities or regional development authorities. In the absence of organized
records, registration provides security to transactions and acquisition of title. In rural
areas the land revenue department maintains land records, with details of title and rights
in land and records mutations under the Land Revenue Act 1967 and rules framed under
the statute. The TMA tax on transfer of property is levied in addition to the provincial
taxes which are registration or mutation fee and stamp duty. At the same time federal
capital value tax is also collected. The TMA collection is the smaller item in the total
collection made at the registrar’s office or by the patwari.
The TMA collection is carried out through contractors. Contracts are annually
awarded through competitive bidding. The process is formal but the information
asymmetry works against the TMA. The contractors have better information of the
market; the TMAs do not have experts with knowledge of land transactions.
Base and Rate. The tax is applied to all immovable property transactions. The
value of the transaction forms the base for the tax. The value is determined by the
registrar in urban areas and patwari in the rural areas. For urban areas a committee under
the District Collector formulates and notifies a valuation table. This table is updated
every few years. Although the committee takes different market transactions into account
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the valuation tables have been under discussion and many view them to be undervaluing
the transaction taking place in the market. The TMA does not have a say in the assigning
value to any transaction. In the rural areas, value is determined to the satisfaction of the
patwari. Again the TMA does not have a role in valuation.
The rates vary across provinces and jurisdictions but generally fall in the range of
0.5 to 1 percent of the value of the transaction. Table 17 shows the current tax rates in the
provinces.
The tax rate is set by the province and applies to the whole province. TMA does
not have any discretion in setting the rate. The rates have not been revised in the
provinces since 2001.

Administration
The tax collection contractor deputes personnel at the registrar’s office. The
transaction value is determined by the registrar using valuation tables notified by the
district collector. In many cases the tables are not updated frequently enough to keep up
with the market. The registrar collects the provincial registration fee. Stamp duty is
collected through the sale of stamp paper. The value determined for the provincial levy
becomes the base for the local tax. The contractor does not have a say in determining the
value of the property.
Records are kept by the contractor. They are in the form of payment receipts. The
registrar keeps a copy of the deed. As such there is no record of transactions other than
these documents. Organized records for transfers do not exist for urban areas. For rural
areas, patwari maintains a mutations register.
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The contractor determines the liability on the basis of value affixed by the
registrar. In rural areas, the patwari determines the value of the transaction. He also
calculates the local transfer tax.
Tax payers make the payment in the form of cash to the contractor. The
contractors keeps the collection in his account. At the end of each month he deposits the
agreed monthly instalment in the TMA accounts. In general the total contract is divided
in thirteen instalments. He is asked to deposit the first instalment at the signing of the
contract and the remaining twelve instalments are due at the end of each calendar month.
The amount deposited in the TMA account at the end of each month may or may not
have any connection with the actual collection. Complaints about collection by contractor
are addressed by the TO Finance.
Administration of transfer of property tax is problematic. The collection suffers
from several weaknesses:
(i)

The TMAs award annual contracts based on a competitive biddingprocess.
The reserve price that they announce is generally an incremental increase
in the previous year’s price. They do not conduct valuation surveys or
market research to compute a more realistic reserve price.

(ii)

The staff deputed to the task is inadequate in more than one ways. The in
house expertise of TMAs is weak. They do not have experts on the staff
rolls who have experience of the property market.

(iii)

Collusion among the contractors is not an unknown happening. Therefore,
it seems that generally the contracts are awarded for much lower amounts
than they should be.

(iv)

The contractors depute their personnel for collection to sit outside the
registrar’s office. The registrar out of courtesy or due to government
instructions will insist on seeing a receipt for transfer of property tax
before his attestation. The valuation of the property is however carried out
by the registrar. He will do so by reviewing the reported value of
transaction. The incentives to under invoice the value of property are
there. But at the same time provincial governments have not placed any
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system to ensure that under invoicing could be prevented. A low valuation
of the transaction for the provincial registration fee will also result in a
low collection of the local government’s transfer tax.
(v)

The contractor’s representative at the collection does not have clear
incentives to collect revenue for the municipality. If the parties offer to
settle for a sufficiently low valuation resulting in a lower liability, they can
still save after paying to the contractor. The only case where the contractor
will exert to collect a higher amount is if his contract amount is not too
low.

(vi)

The contractor’s representative collects the revenues and deposits the
amount according to the payment schedule, not necessarily according to
the receipts.

(viii) The penalty clauses in the contract are seldom invoked forcefully when the
contractor does not pay a full amount. In case where they are invoked, the
default cases drag on in courts for long periods of time. In many cases a
lesser cost solution is to arrive at a settlement with the contractor rather
than spending on legal fees. Overall it creates perverse incentives for the
contractors.
(ix)

The contract is designed as a lump sum amount payable to the TMA. In
early years this type of contract was probably a good instrument to hedge
against the unpredictability of the base, specially when the TMAs had low
expertise in the area. With time there is sufficient evidence of the level of
transaction and value of property in the markets. In some rural
jurisdictions it might be less so.

Water rate
Water rate is a major source of revenue for TMAs. In the illustrative cases it is
…to… percent of TMA revenue. Water is collected for both the water supply schemes in
urban areas and rural areas. Historically local governments as well as provincial PHE
have not been able to recover sufficient amount to meet the costs of supply or carry out
due maintenance of systems. This has occurred due to low tariffs, collection inefficiency
and the trend to subsidize drinking water supply.
Issues. Water supply is mostly piped water. Nearly all TMAs use supply tankers
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also. Capital investment in many cases is dependent on provincial grants. A large number
of TMAs do not have the finances to invest in upgradation or expansion. Gujranwala city,
one of the large urban TMAs in Punjab negotiated a grant from the province for a major
upgradation of its water supply. Operating costs are also high. In 2004 88 out of 144
Punjab TMAs had accumulated arrears on electricity bills. At various occasions
provinces have carried out at source deductions to settle the electricity dues. This practice
has been discontinued as it created unpredictability for the TMA revenues. The gap
between water rate revenue and operating cost however remains. Table 18 illustrates the
case for five TMAs, including both urban and rural jurisdictions.
Sialkot is the only case where the revenue is greater than the operating cost. A
detailed inquiry may reveal how this has been achieved. In the other four TMAs, Attock
and Sukhar have large urban centers whereas Qilla Abdullah is largely rural. In all three
the gap is more than 50 percent of the operating expenditure. Zarghoon Town shows a
different case. It is a Town under a city district and collection has been centralized to the
city’s Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA). All major cities have their WASA which
many times operate independently of the local government. In Lahore a share of property
tax is being given to WASA as a subsidy. WASA shows it as a revenue in their budget,
which is not a good practice in the long run. Provinces have achieved various milestones
in handing WASAs to the respective cities. In Karachi it is most advanced with the City
Nazim chairing the Karachi Water and Sanitation Board (KWSB). The chief operating
officer reports to the city district government. Last month the provincial government,
using the legal provision in the KWSB Act, centralized the organization.
Rate. Rates are set by local councils in each case. We do not have data to analyze
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the rates in detail. Interviews with officials indicated that rates are very low, often
ranging between Rs.100 to 300. But a comprehensive picture may be different.
Reportedly rates are not increased to keep up with the increases in operating costs or to
generate funds for capital investment in the supply systems.
Administration. Municipal administrations keep manual records of all
connections. Meters are seldom used. Mostly connections are classified as domestic and
commercial, with the commercial having a higher tariff. Many ‘illegal’ connections are
also reported. These connections are taken by individuals from the water lines on their
own.
Municipal authorities send notice by post to the water users. In some cases,
service is achieved by inspectors or municipal staff delivering the notices personally.
Collection practice also vary. Payment can be in the form of cash to the inspectors,
deposit in the office or through a form in the designated branch of a bank.

Tax on vehicles other than motor vehicles
This tax is levied on tongas, animal driven carts, bicycles and other modes of
transport using animals. These vehicles do no pay the provincial motor vehicles tax.
There is no requirement for registration with the Excise & Taxation department. The
vehicles in this category are registered with the TMA. Registration is carried out by entry
in the records. But registration does not cover all such vehicles in most jurisdictions.
Most of the tax base is not captured. In the rural parts of a TMA there is no mechanism to
register vehicles or enforce the requirement.
Base and Rate. All animal driven and human pedalled vehicles are the base. The
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municipal authorities cannot add other category of vehicle to their base. The definitions
are prescribed by the provincial law. They have the discretion to set the rate. We do not
have data to do a detailed analysis of the rate.
Administration. The municipal staff identifies vehicles. This is carried out through
random checks in the urban areas. Records are maintained in registers. In many cases the
record keeping is not up to date. Liability is determined according to the type of the
vehicle. Municipal staff collects the tax from the owners mostly as cash. Voluntary
deposits take place but are not the rule. In most cases, random checks are used to recover
the tax.

Business licenses
Similar to the district business license, TMAs have the authority to require
licenses from businesses operating in their jurisdictions. TMAs typically send out
inspectors to document various types of shops and imposes a fixed annual fee for the
right to carry out business in its jurisdiction. Earlier licenses to all types of local business
were with the TMAs. In 2005 some of the business have been given to districts to
increase their tax base.
Tax Base. The TMAs issue licenses to shops, vendors and small operations like
tailors, painters, meat shops and other sales operations. Districts license larger operations
like poultry farms, timber processing etc. Each unit is treated as a tax payer. Differences
in the size of business do not account for difference in the category of business. The rates
vary among jurisdictions but generally are low within the range of Rs.50 to a 300
hundred rupees per annum.
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Administration. TMA staff from the taxation office carry out periodic physical
surveys and document shops and business according to their type. After this identification
they serve notices upon the business informing them of their tax liability. Collection is
mostly through personal visits of the staff to the business offices or shops. Records are
not kept in a systematic manner. Attempts to levy these taxes are not popular. Therefore
TMAs have mostly relied on a mix of voluntary compliance and creation of sufficient
pressure through moral suasion and personal efforts of the taxation staff. In some cases
defaulters are given notices and cases for recovery are taken to court. The cost of
pursuing court cases is high for both parties, but the marginal cost decreases for the TMA
as the number of cases increases: the result of court cases is expeditious payment and
withdrawal of the case in a large number of cases.

Special charges and fees
Special charges and fees are levied by TMAs for specific services. A wide range
of services are used for collecting charges or fees. Table 17 shows some items on which
charges are fees are levied. Individual items do not make a substantial share of TMA
revenue. But fees and charges together add up to an important fraction. Table 15 above
shows that fees add up to 27 percent of TMA revenue in Sialkot but form only 2 percent
of the same in Sukhar.

Union Administration
Unions do not have any taxation power. They receive a lump sum grant from the
province for staff salary and utilities. They are not allowed to incur capital expenditure or
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create recurrent liabilities. They are planning bodies for the TMA and district and linked
through the Naib-Nazim and Nazim.

VIII. Conclusions and Options for Reform
Pakistan’s system of local government taxation in its infancy. How it develops
will be determined by the type of fiscal decentralization that the country wants. And how
local government tax policy develops will play a role in determining the success of the
fiscal decentralization program.

Fiscal decentralization is a key component of

development policy. It can enhance accountability of local service providers and promote
efficiency.
If local government finance becomes an important agenda item for the
Government, it might consider two proposals.

First, the central and provincial

governments need to develop a strategy for fiscal decentralization to the local
government level, i.e., an underlying policy structure. Second, this analysis of Pakistan’s
situation and the international practice suggest that there are good options for
strengthening local government taxation. But these need to be thought through in detail,
and need to be based on empirical evidence that presently does not exist. The leadership
in this effort must rest with the central and provincial levels.
Strategy and Structure
There are a number of structural issues that the government might consider in
developing its program for local government taxation.

These should be considered

before specific proposals for local taxes are evaluated and moved toward legislation.
First is the question of expenditure assignment.

The “right” level of local
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government revenue-raising cannot be identified until it is decided what level of
expenditure responsibility local governments will have. This is a decision that rests with
provincial governments.

The more important the functional assignments, the more

significant the revenue raising powers to be shifted to the local governments. At present,
there is an expenditure list for local governments in each province, but as noted above, it
remains murky. Only with a transparent set of expenditure assignments can the costing
out be done to determine how much revenue access is needed by local governments. At
present, neither the provincial nor the local governments have much access to productive
revenue bases. Provincial and local government taxation in total probably accounts for
less than – percent of total national tax revenues.
The second structural issue is that the government needs to determine what kind
of fiscal decentralization program it wants.

There are two versions.

One is the

assignment of functions to local governments, together with some autonomy in budget
allocations and in service delivery.

This could be financed by intergovernmental

transfers, with minimal or no local government taxing powers. This is a quite viable
arrangement, and is more or less followed in most developing countries. This is the
system favored by most local government elected administrations – it puts them in the
safe place of spending the money of a higher level government. In turn it creates weak
accountability of the local executive to its electorate. The alternative is a local financing
system that places more emphasis on stronger accountability of elected local officials to
voters. In this case, a significant local tax component is a necessary part of the structure.
Third, the strategy for implementing fiscal decentralization and local taxation
might involve an asymmetric approach. In particular, the urban local governments could
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be moved first toward heavier reliance on local government taxes. The justification is that
they have the strongest tax bases and potentially the strongest tax administrations. The
government might even go so far as to set targets for the fiscal self reliance of urban local
governments. Smaller and rural local governments under this strategy would remain
heavily dependent on transfers. The goal under such a system would be to reduce the
reliance of urban local governments on transfers, use this money to fund services in rural
areas, and increase the overall level of revenue mobilization. For the asymmetric
approach to work, the current uniform treatment of local governments will need to give
way to a more capacity based tax assignment.
Finally, the strategy might include structuring the provincial-local transfer system
to provide an incentive for increased local government tax effort. This strategy will
require some careful design, but it might work along the following lines. A revenue
sharing pool specifically for tax effort would be established, and would be distributed
among urban local governments according to how they made use of their newfound
taxing powers. The rural local governments will continue to have a heavier dependence
on transfers. PFC awards would be restructured to align incentive correctly with the tax
assignment scheme.
Before a new structure can be designed and put in place, the government needs a
better capability to monitor and evaluate its local tax system. At present, there is no
information system for local government finance in Pakistan. In fact, neither the federal
nor the provincial governments can report how much is spent by local governments, or
how much revenue they raise, or how much disparity there is in either of these series.
Only anecdotal evidence or small surveys are available. The design and implementation
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of a fiscal information system for local government finance is an essential early step.
The way forward for Pakistan might be to have these questions vetted before a
blue ribbon commission on intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Specific Tax Proposals
If the focus of local government tax reform is on urban local governments, there
is no shortage of options for increased revenue mobilization. In some cases, this involves
an upgrading of tax levies that are already in play in Pakistan. In other cases, it could
involve new taxes.

Districts: Education and Health Tax.
These two new taxes were suggested by ordinance, but the rate or base was not
specified in either case. Consequently, they have not been implemented. Therefore, the
next step is for the provincial governments to think through the intent of these new taxes,
e.g., are they meant to be taxes on education and health activities, or are they meant to be
new taxes or higher tax rates on some existing base that are earmarked for education and
health expenditure. Or, is the idea really to enhance local government revenues, and then
allow the local elected body decide if it will spend more on health and education? The
blue ribbon commission on local government tax reform can make this a priority decision
item.

Urban Districts: Piggyback Income Tax
The larger urban districts have significant sized formal sector payrolls with a great
deal of revenue potential. A local government payroll tax would fit the norm for a good
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local tax in that the burdens would remain local, and the yield could be substantial
enough to fund increased local services. The problem of administration would be the big
obstacle, as even the largest urban government would probably not have the wherewithal
to assess and collect a payroll tax. However, the local governments could piggyback on
federal collections. If local government rate setting were allowed (within limits), this
could become a true “local” tax, where elected politicians would be transparently
responsible for the higher taxes imposed on local residents. Whether a piggyback version
as is described here would violate the constitution is another question.
Urban Districts: Motor Vehicle Taxes
Urban districts could impose motor vehicle license fees, at significantly higher
rates than at present.

These could be in addition to the provincial taxes, or as a

replacement for them.

The tax could be revenue productive, easily administered, and

local governments would have the power of rate setting. This might be viewed as being
competitive with provincial motor vehicle taxes, but this need not be the case. Provincial
governments could reduce the amount of grants to the local governments to compensate,
or it could allow this local tax as an add-on to provincial rates which are presently quite
low.

TMA’s: Urban Immovable Property Tax
The main source of revenue for the TMA could become the urban immovable
property tax. The TMA could be empowered to set the property tax rate and would
receive the revenues. The administration of the property tax would be shared by the
province (valuation), the district (collection and identification of the tax roll) and the
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TMA (setting rates). This has been discussed above, and is a longstanding proposal for
property tax reform in Pakistan.

TMA’s: Land Value Increment Taxes
TMA’s could tax a portion of the land value increments due to public investments
in urban areas. The administration of such value capture taxes would be combined with
the urban immovable property tax.

TMA’s: Professions tax
The tax on professions could be transferred to the local governments along with
the power set the tax rate and the tax base.
Some more considerations
There has been some discussion in the country on assigning retail level sales tax
to local government. Due to administrative difficulties this proposal will need to be
evaluated carefully.
There is a case for assigning natural resource royalties to local government. This
can be an important source of revenue for rural districts. However, it will need to be
structured appropriately.

Endnote
This report is a working draft rather than a polished finished product. The basic
elements of the study are here, but there is much to do to flesh out some of the analysis
and to more fully develop the policy recommendations offered for consideration.

A
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major problem that we encountered in doing this work is that there are very little data to
examine the present practices of local government finance in Pakistan. We have brought
whatever anecdotal data we could find to this study, and think we developed a rough
picture of what is going on, but it still is very impressionistic.
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Table 1
Local Governments in Pakistan

Balochistan
NWFP
Punjab
Sindh
Total

DG
28
24
35
23

TMA
77
54
144
121

Unions
567
986
3464
1114

110

396

6131

Source: NRB, Government of Pakistan
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Table 2
Source of Local Revenue25
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•

25

District Councils
Education tax.
Health tax.
Tax on vehicles other than
motor vehicles.
Local rate on lands
assessable to land revenue.
Fees in respect of schools,
colleges,
and
health
facilities established or
maintained by the district
government.
Fees for licenses granted
by the district government.
Fees for specific services
rendered by a district
government.
Collection charges for
recovery of tax on behalf of
the
government
as
prescribed.
Toll on new roads, bridges,
within the limits of a
district, other than national
and provincial highways
and roads.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Tehsil and Town Councils
Local tax on services.
Tax on the transfer of immovable
property.
Property tax on annual rental value of
buildings and lands.
Fee on advertisement, other than on
radio and television, and billboards.
Fee for fairs, agricultural shows, cattle
fairs,
industrial
exhibitions,
tournaments and other public events.
Fee for approval of building plans and
erection and re-erection of buildings.
Fee for licenses or permits and
penalties or fines for violation of the
licensing rules.
Charges for execution and maintenance
of works of public utility like lighting
of
public
places,
drainage,
conservancy, and water supply.
Fee on cinemas, theatrical shows and
tickets thereof, and other entertainment.
Collection charges for recovery of any
tax on behalf of the Government,
District
Government,
Union
Administration or any statutory
authority as prescribed.

Devolution in Pakistan, ADB/DfID/WB 2004

Union administrations
Fees for licensing of
professions
and
vocations.
• Fee on sale of
animals in cattle
markets.
• Market fees.
• Fees for certification
of births, marriages
and deaths.
• Charges for specific
services rendered by
the union council.
• Rate
for
the
remuneration
of
village
and
neighborhood
guards.
• Rate
for
the
execution
or
maintenance of any
work
of
public
utility like lighting
of public places,
drainage,
conservancy
and
water supply.
•
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Table 3

Province
Punjab
Sindh
NWFP
Balochistan

District Population Variation
Population Estimates 2004
Min
Max
Mean
945,000

7,171,000

2,457,559

760,000

11,296,000

2,052,412

275,000

2,328,000

39,000

879,000

852,333
292,192

Source: Pakistan Population Data Sheet, National Institute of
Population Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, January 2007.

Local Government Taxation in Pakistan

Table 4
Two Types of Districts

City
Punjab
Sindh
NWFP
Balochistan

5
1
1
1

Districts
Ordinary
30
22
23
27

Source: ADB Decentralization Support Program
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Table 5
Districts: Revenue by source (percent of total income) a

Punjab
1
2
3
4
6
Sindh
7
Balochistanc
8
9
10
11
NWFP
12
13

District

Tax

Non-tax

Transfers

Capital Incomeb

Attock
Chakwal
Faisalabad
Lahore
Sialkot

0
1
0
2
1

1
0
2
5
0

85
91
76
82
85

14
8
22
13
14

Karachi

20

7

70

3

Pishin
Qilla Abdullah
Quetta
Sibi

0
0
2
0

0
0
0
0

93
54
89
94

7
46
9
6

Mardan
Peshawar

1
0

2
4

84
91

13
5

Source: ADB Decentralization Support Program
Notes
a
The data are based on revised budget estimates collected by ADB Decentralization Support Program for
the study.
b
Capital income includes opening balance in some cases. Local governments apparently do not follow a
uniform classification.
c
Some of the zeros may be classification errors.
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Table 6
TMA Revenue by source (percent of total revenue) a

Punjab
1
2
3
4
Sindh
5
6
Balochistanc
7
8
9
NWFPc
10
11
12

TMA

Tax

Non-Tax

Transfers

Capital/Op
Balance b

Unclassified

Attock
Gulberg Town
Bhalwal
Sialkot

27.8
46.2
6.8
29.3

41.0
9.7
29.8
35.5

30.6
20.2
58.3
34.6

0.3
0.0
3.7
0.6

0.3
23.8
1.4
0.0

Liaqatabad Town
Sukkur

36.1

6.9

19.0

32.8

5.2

Barshore (Pishin )
Qilla Abdullah (Chaman)
Zarghoon Town (Quetta)

0.0
0.0
12.8

0.0
0.0
0.0

63.0
77.8
79.7

29.3
16.3
1.0

7.6
5.8
6.5

Charsadda
Mardan
Nowshera

4.2
19.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

34.6
10.9
100.0

2.9
6.5
0.0

58.4
62.7
0.0

Source: ADB Decentralization Support Program
Notes
a
The data are based on revised budget estimates collected by ADB Decentralization Support Program for
the study.
b
Capital income includes opening balance in some cases. Local governments apparently do not follow a
uniform classification.
c
Some of the zeros may be classification errors.

Table 7
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Assignment of Functions
Province

Local

Education
Colleges
Technical and vocational education

Education
Secondary education
Elementary education

Health
Secondary health
Tertiary health
Criminal justice and public order
Highways and inter district roads
Agriculture
Industrial development
Transport
Irrigation
Water supply and sanitation
Mineral development
Power development
Land administration
Social welfare
Environment

Health
Primary health care

Small roads, streets
Agricultural extension
Industrial promotion (city district only)

Water supply and sanitation

Land administration
Community development
Environment

Local government (for framing laws)
Urban development and building control
Regulation

Municipal services
Building control
Municipal regulation

Notes
a) Dashed lines show that the function has been partially decentralized. There is a co-occupation of
mandate is these cases.
b) Regular lines show that the function has no provincial office in the district after decentralization.
But there may be vertical programs in these sectors for provincial priorities.
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Table 8
Revenue Structure of Provincial Governments in 2005-2006
Punjab

Direct Taxes:
Urban Property Tax
Agriculture income tax
Registration fee (Transfer of Property)
Land revenueb (includes mutation fee
Taxes on professions, trades & callings
Indirect Taxes:
Motor vehicle tax
GST on Services
Stamp duties
Entertainment tax
Electricity duties
Hotel tax
Provincial excises
Education cess
Cotton cess
Otherc
Totald

NWFP

Rupees
(in millions)

Percent of own
source revenuesa

Rupees
(in millions)

Percent of own
source revenuesa

674
658
2,113
3,392
225

2.28
2.23
7.15
11.48
0.76

300
70
42
330
75

6.70
1.56
0.94
7.37
1.67

4,154
2,224
5,859
13
1,270
245
846
0
443
31
22,180

14.06
7.53
19.83
0.04
4.30
0.83
2.86
0.00
1.50
0.11
74.97

677
420
300
13
270
29
30
57
43
2,762

15.11
9.37
6.70
0.29
6.03
0.65
0.67
1.26
0.00
0.96
59.27

Source: Calculations are based on provincial revenue time series data provided by the World Bank, Islamabad.
Notes:
a
Own source revenue is a total of tax and non tax receipts.
b
Includes transfers by mutation and miscellaneous land revenue.
c
The "other" category is calculated as a residual and there are wide variations between years, indicating there may be changes in classification. The NWFP
collection reported under "other" is Rs.150 for 2005-2006, while it was less than Rs.5 million in the three preceding years. We use the average amount of the
four years for this table.
The total does not add to 100 percent because non-tax receipts are not included. The total for NWFP is based on actual collections in 2005-2006 and does not use
the calculation for others described in note ‘c’.
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Table 9
PFC Transfers to Local Government

PCF

PA

GST

LG Share

Rupees
Balochistan
NWFP
Sindh

182783
49747
36016.89

42753
19648
14468.86

14000
1683
2787.016

Percent
56753
21331
17255.88

31
43
48

Notes
a) The data are based on revised estimates for 2006-2007 reported in the provincial Annual Budget
Statements for 2007-2008.
b) LG Share is the sum of PA, provincial allocable and GST, General Sales Tax grant for local
governments. PCF is the provincial consolidated fund.
c) The horizontal shares formulas are as follows:
a. Balochistan weighs population and area equally.
b. NWFP calculates the share using population and an underdevelopment index which in turn
comprises development ranking based on service delivery coverage and outcomes in health,
education and drinking water and sanitation.
c. Punjab allocates funds on an index developed from population, urbanization and
underdevelopment.
d. Sindh allocates shares on population, underdevelopment and revenue raising capacity. The
latter rewards districts with higher tax bases.
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Table 10
Urban Local Government Taxes

Country
South Africa

Tax
Payroll and
Turnovera

Percent of
Local Revenues

Administration
Metropolitan and
Muncipal
Governments

Autonomy
Arrangements
Tax rates set
locally, but frozen
since 1996

Colombia

Gross
Receipts

Brazil

Sales Tax
On Services

10

Local

Tax rates set
locally

Uganda

Graduated
personal taxa

---

Local

Tax rate set
Centrally

a
b

40

Municipal
Governments

Source
Bahl and
Solomon
(2003)
Acosta and
Bird (2005)

The RSC levy is abolished effective FY07, and replaced by a compensatory grant.
Combination of a poll tax and a presumptive income tax

Alfonso and
Araújo
(forthcoming)
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Table 11
Property Taxation in Selected Countries

Country
(Year)
Colombia
(1999)

Poland (2004)

Argentina
(2004)

Brazil (2004)

Property
Tax Base

Percent of
Local Govt.
Revenue

Local Rate
Setting
Power

Source

Local in large
cities,
otherwise central

100

Chaparro, Swart
and Zapata

Rates are
centrally set

Local Government

100

Swianiewia
(forthcoming)

34

Rates locally set
within limits

Local

100

Asensio
(forthcoming)

7

Rates are

Local

100

Afonso and
Arajo
(forthcoming)

Market Value
of Property

35

Municipal Gvt.
may choose
within a range

Area-based

15

A combination
of market value
and economic
activity
Capital value,
indexed

Administration

Percent of
Revenue to
Local Govt.

locally set
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Table 12
Property Tax Revenues in Selected Cities
Share of Local
Government Revenues
(in Percent)

City

Year

Property Tax Base

Bangkok

1997

12.5 percent of the
annual rental value
of non residential
and residential
premises (excluding
those that are
owner-occupied).

Rio de Janeiro

1998

Capital value,
indexed for inflation

15.9

The World
Bank
(1999)

Annual rental valueb

5.1a

The World
Bank (2004)

Area Based

5.1a

The World
Bank (2004)

Mumbai

Bangalore
a
b

2002

2005

FY 2000
There are twelve different rate categories.

7.2

Source
The World
Bank
(2000)
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Table 13
Local Taxes in Rural Local Governments
Country

Tax

Base

(Year)

Poland (2004)

Property

Area

Uganda (2004)

Personal

Presumptive

Tax

Tax on

(Head Tax)

Income

Property
Tax

Annual Value
Area

India
(Panchayats

Percent of

Local Rate

Administration

Source

Revenues

Setting
Power

13.1

None

Local

Swianiewicz
(forthcoming)

……

None

Local

…….

Yes

Local

Sethi (2005)
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Table 14
District Government Expenditure.
Percent Distribution of the Financing
Nontax

Transfers

0.000
1.380
0.046
0.025

0.509
0.201
2.292
5.135
0.200

85
91
76
82
79

21.858

7.122

74

Tax
Punjab
Attock
Chakwal
Faisalabad
Lahore
Sialkot
Sindh
Karachi
Balochistan
Pishin
Qilla Abdullah
Quetta
Sibi
NWFP
Mardan
Peshawar

92
91
87
93

1.758

1.423
0.106

0.786
1.770

83
37

Source: ADB Decentralization Support Program.
The data are for 2006-2007.The blanks indicate that no reliable estimates were
available for the item.
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Table 15
TMA Sialkot

TMA Sukhar

Rupees

Percent of total
revenue

Rupees

Percent of total
revenue

Total Revenue

587,002,256

100.0

219,685,079

100.0

Fees

156,522,876

26.7

4,338,200

2.0

Rent

3,500,000

0.6

6,960,300

3.2

12,050,000

2.1

35,000

0.0

1,500,000

0.3

3,000

0.0

33,461,380

5.7

13,000,000

5.9

100,000,000

17.0

1,300,000

0.6

1,000,000

0.2

600,000

0.3

38,500,000

6.6

10,510,000

4.8

2,510,000

0.4

103,000

0.0

Total OSR

349,044,256

59.5

36,849,500

16.8

Grants and other income

237,958,000

40.5

182,835,579

83.2

Business taxes
Tax on non motorized vehicles
UIPT Share
Transfer of property tax
Tax on advertisements
Water rate
Cattle market/fairs

Source: ADB Decentralization Support Program.
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Table 16
Provincial Shares in One-Sixth of GST
Province
Balochistan
NWFP
Punjab
Sindh

Share in Local Government GST Pool
5.22
9.93
50.00
34.85

Source: Pakistan, Government of (2006a) (Inter-governmental Fiscal Relation),
http://www.mng.gov.pk/icfd/presentations/default.asp
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Table 17
Revenue (major items)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

TMA
Attock
Gulberg Town Lahore
Bhalwal (Sargodha)
Sialkot
Karachi (Liaqatabad Town)
Sukkur
Barshore (Pishin )
Qilla Abdullah (Chaman)
Zarghoon Town (Quetta)
Charsadda
Mardan
Nowshera

(Percent of total)
UIPT Water Rate
19
6
28
2
13
6
5
8
0.1
13
4
6
9

3
0.2
3
2
8

OSR (minus WR)
69
80
38
65
48
8
6
19
63
83
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Table 18
Water & Sanitation Cost and Revenue (Rupees)
Water
revenue

rate
Current Budget

Gap (precent of
expenditure)

Attock

6,000,000

38,099,000

(84)

Sialkot

38,500,000

20,500,000

88

Sukhar
Qilla
(Chaman)
Zarghoon
(Quetta)

10,500,000

25,212,500

(58)

52,000

2,063,025

(97)

-

120,472,584

(100)

Abdullah
Town

Source: TMA Annual Budget Statements, 2007-2008. The data are the revised estimates for 2006-2007.
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